Descartes is often accused of having fragmented the human being into two independent substances, mind and body, with no clear strategy for explaining the apparent unity of human experience. Deborah Brown argues that, contrary to this view, Descartes did in fact have a conception of a single, integrated human being, and that in his view this conception is crucial to the success of human beings as rational and moral agents and as practitioners of science. The passions are pivotal in this, and in a rich and wide-ranging discussion she examines Descartes' place in the tradition of thought about the passions, the metaphysics of actions and passions and sensory representation, and Descartes' account of self-mastery and virtue. Her study is an important and original reading not only of Descartes' account of mind-body unity but also of his theory of mind.
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This book is dedicated to my parents, Margaret and George, and to my sister, Catherine, for their love, laughter and generosity. The surprisingly lush vegetation around where I live grows out of the notorious 'Brisbane shale', a flaky mixture of mud, silt and brittle sedimentary rock. Clinging precariously to a cliff of this rubbish is a loquat tree, whose roots are few and frantically gripping whatever stable soil it can find, and whose trunk is spindly and clawed by possums, but whose fruit, for those willing to work around the many obnoxious stones, is delicious. Descartes locates his account of the passions among the fruits of his 'tree of knowledge', but most, finding the roots insecure and the trunk inevitably thin, do not venture that they will find anything at the end of the branches. Sometimes though you just have to follow the possums. My own possums are Lilli Alanen and Calvin Normore. Lilli provided the initial impetus to write on the passions for a conference in Helsinki in 1996, and has kept the pressure steadily up since then. She has been an inspiration, a mentor and a friend, and I am so very grateful to her for her comments on earlier drafts and discussing these topics with me over the intervening years.
There are many obnoxious stones in Descartes' philosophy, and he would have seemed much less interesting to me had it not been for Calvin Normore, who directed me towards the metaphysical fun stuff in Descartes' philosophy of mind: the union of mind and body, action and passion, sensory representation, the will and virtue -and towards the medieval traditions against which Descartes must(!) be understood. I thank him for his encouragement and attention (without devotion), his sound advice on matters of text, translation and argument, and for the two suns of our cosmos.
Many thanks also to friends of the inter-Nordic community of scholars who graciously accepted a Queenslander as an honorary Viking. Thanks especially to Mikko Yrjönsuuri and Henrik Lagerlund, and to the regulars of the inter-Nordic mind fests: Christopher Martin (for advice on floating men), Peter King (for a good time, always), Simo Knuuttila, Sten Ebbesen, viii
